The American Way of War by
One of the most distinguished books of military history ever written, The American Way of War has provided countless readers with a firm understanding of the evolution of U.S. military strategy and policy.
The Echo of Battle: The Army's way of war by
In the face of radically new ways of waging war, Brian Linn surveys the past assumptions - and errors - that underlie the army's many visions of warfare. He explores the army's forgotten heritage of deterrence, it's long experience with counter-guerrilla operations, and it's successive efforts to transform itself.
Annihilation by
From 1937 to 1945 the world witnessed a succession of savage military policies, innovations, and actions on the field, in the water, and in the skies that resulted in the butchery of over fifty million people. The military history of the Second World War involves heroism and evil, effectiveand hopeless strategies, bold and pointless operations, calculation and luck, politics and diplomacy, and production and attrition. This study incorporates recent scholarship on the military history of the Second World War to examine both chronologically and in a comprehensive geographic way themost destructive event in recorded human history. Annihilation argues that World War II evolved into a war of annihilation - a total war - that engulfed militaries and civilians alike, and spared no country either destruction or blame for the carnage. The book questions the adopted intention of the"good war" thesis by wielding the "strategy of annihilation" on all sides as an architectural framework. Readers will find global coverage linking together all theaters of the conflict in a narrative that advances from the beginning to end of the war. This is the first study of the World War II thatallows instructors to assign chapters of the book according to time periods or by place.
Korean Showdown by
A historical analysis of the policies and military strategies applied during the Korean War stalemate period Korean Showdown: National Policy and Military Strategy in a Limited War, 1951-1952 takes a holistic and integrative approach to strategy, operations, and tactics during the Korean War's stalemate period and demonstrates how these matters shaped each other and influenced, or were influenced by, political and strategic policy decision-making. Bryan R. Gibby offers an analysis of the major political and military decisions affecting how the war was conducted operationally and diplomatically by examining American, Chinese, North Korean, and South Korean operations in the context of fighting a limited war with limited means, but for objectives that were not always limited in scope or ambition. The foundational political decision was Harry Truman's voluntary repatriation policy, which extended the war by up to eighteen months. Its military counterpart was the American-led Operation Showdown, the last deliberate military offensive to coerce concessions at the negotiation table. Showdown's failure (and the Communists' own equally disappointing military efforts) opened up new avenues for solving the war short of a militarily imposed solution. Gibby's research draws on primary sources from American, Korean, and Chinese archives and publications. Many of these sources have not yet been mined in diplomatic and military histories of the Korean War. This innovative book also addresses a significant gap in the study of Korean military operations--the linkage between ground and air pressure campaigns, as well as the many Chinese and American operations conducted to establish negotiation positions. Gibby also explores many political and propagandist developments that assumed great importance in the summer of 1952, such as prisoner of war riots, the bombing of hydroelectric dams, and the South Korean constitutional crisis, which significantly influenced American and Chinese military decision-making. Ultimately, this volume serves as a cautionary analysis of the limits of force, the necessity to understand an adversary, and the importance of strategic consensus. It also offers an effective case study on an underappreciated period of civil-military tension during the Cold War and on how civilian politicians and military leaders must collaborate to determine a realistic and effective strategy.
The Forgotten War by
Military history of the Korean War that combines battlefield level detail with command-level history as well as the domestic and international political dimensions of the war.
A History of Modern Wars of Attrition by
A war of attrition is usually conceptualized as a bloody slogging match, epitomized by imagery of futile frontal assaults on the Western Front of the First World War. As such, many academics, politicians, and military officers currently consider attrition to be a wholly undesirable method of warfare. This first book-length study of wars of attrition challenges this viewpoint. A historical analysis of the strategic thought behind attrition demonstrates that it was often implemented to conserve casualties, not to engage in a bloody senseless assault. Moreover, attrition frequently proved an effective means of attaining a state's political aims in warfare, particularly in serving as a preliminary to decisive warfare, reducing risk of escalation, and coercing an opponent in negotiations. Malkasian analyzes the thought of commanders who implemented policies of attrition from 1789 to the present. His study includes figures central to the study of war, such as the Duke of Wellington, Carl von Clausewitz, B. H. Liddell Hart, General William Slim, General Douglas MacArthur, General Matthew Ridgeway, and General William Westmoreland. While special attention is devoted to the Second World War in the Pacific and the Korean War, this study notes the utility of attrition during the Cold War, as the risk of a Third World War rendered more aggressive strategies unattractive. Increasingly, the United States finds itself facing conflicts that are not amenable to a decisive military solution in which opponents seek prolonged war that will inflict as many casualties as possible on American forces.
Stalemate by
Recounts the 1967-1970 War of Attrition in the Middle East and aims to make the reader aware of the opportunity for peace that was missed. The author has served as US State Department's Office Director for Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, and as a US envoy.
After the Taliban by
In October 2001, the Bush administration sent Amb. James F. Dobbins, who had overseen nation-building efforts in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, to war-torn Afghanistan to help the Afghans assemble a successor government to the Taliban. From warlords to exiled royalty, from turbaned tribal chieftains to elegant émigré intellectuals, Ambassador Dobbins introduces a range of colorful Afghan figures competing for dominance in the new Afghanistan. His firsthand account of the post-9/11 American diplomacy also reveals how collaboration within Bush's war cabinet began to break down almost as soon as major combat in Afghanistan ceased. His insider's memoir recounts how the administration reluctantly adjusted to its new role as nation-builder, refused to allow American soldiers to conduct peacekeeping operations, opposed dispatching international troops, and shortchanged Afghan reconstruction as its attention shifted to Iraq. In After the Taliban, Dobbins probes the relationship between the Afghan and Iraqi ventures. He demonstrates how each damaged the other, with deceptively easy success in Afghanistan breeding overconfidence and then the latter draining essential resources away from the initial effort. Written by America's most experienced diplomatic troubleshooter, this important new book is for readers looking for insights into how government really works, how diplomacy is actually conducted, and most important why the United States has failed to stabilize either Afghanistan or Iraq.
Afghanistan (Revised Edition) by
For over 2,500 years, the forbidding territory of Afghanistan has served as a vital crossroads for armies and has witnessed history-shaping clashes between civilizations: Greek, Arab, Mongol, and Tartar, and, in more recent times, British, Russian, and American. When U.S. troops entered Afghanistan in the weeks following September 11, 2001, they overthrew the Afghan Taliban regime and sent the terrorists it harbored on the run. But America's initial easy victory is in sharp contrast to the difficulties it faces today in confronting the Taliban resurgence. Originally published in 2002, Stephen Tanner's Afghanistan has now been completely updated to include the crucial turn of events since America first entered the country.
The Iraq War: A military history by
In this unprecedented account of the intensive air and ground operations in Iraq, two of America's most distinguished military historians bring clarity and depth to the first major war of the new millennium. Reaching beyond the blaring headlines, embedded videophone reports, and daily Centcom briefings, Williamson Murray and Robert Scales analyze events in light of past military experiences, present battleground realities, and future expectations. The Iraq War puts the recent conflict into context. Drawing on their extensive military expertise, the authors assess the opposing aims of the Coalition forces and the Iraqi regime and explain the day-to-day tactical and logistical decisions of infantry and air command, as British and American troops moved into Basra and Baghdad. They simultaneously step back to examine long-running debates within the U.S. Defense Department about the proper uses of military power and probe the strategic implications of those debates for America's buildup to this war. Surveying the immense changes that have occurred in America's armed forces between the Gulf conflicts of 1991 and 2003--changes in doctrine as well as weapons--this volume reveals critical meanings and lessons about the new "American way of war" as it has unfolded in Iraq.
On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: the United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003-January 2005 by
NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price On Point II is a comprehensive study of the US Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) from May 2003 to January 2005. Based on primary sources including hundreds of interviews with participants, the study examines how after May 2003 American Soldiers made the transition to a new type of campaign that featured information operations, intelligence, reconstruction, and governance rather than conventional combat. On Point II documents the US Army s execution of Full Spectrum Operations in the early stages of this conflict. Other products produced by the U.S. Army, Combat Studies Institute (CSI) can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1063"
Desert Victory: The war for Kuwait by
Analyzes the Persian Gulf War, describes the strengths and weaknesses of the Coalition forces, and evaluates the strategies and weapons used in the war.
The issue of attrition by J. Boone Bartholmees, Jr.
Firepower, attrition, maneuver -- US Army operations doctrine: A challenge for the 1980s and beyond by Wayne A. Downing
Iraq and Vietnam: differences, similarities, and insights by Jeffrey Record and Andrew Terrill
Political-military lessons from U.S. operations in Vietnam and Afghanistan by Michael Williams
Toward a better understanding of attrition: The Korean and Vietnam Wars by Carter Malkasian
Winning in Afghanistan by Ali Jalali
What went wrong in Afghanistan? by Todd Greentree
The new American way of war by Max Boot
What is wrong with the American way of war? by Antulio Echevarria
If you're asked to find my organization, please search for "Combined Arms Research Library"
Vietnam: The course of a conflict by James H. Willbanks
The evolution of US Army tactical doctrine, 1946-76 by Robert A. Doughty
General Creighton Abrams and the operational approach of attrition in the Vietnam War by Thom D. Frohnhoefer
The American way of operational art: Attrition or maneuver? by Kevin P. Anastas
Development of the American theory of limited war, 1945-63. by Michael W. Cannon
Chapter 15 (Problems of Limited War) from Truce Tent and Fighting Front by Walter G. Hermes
Attritional War: The Neglected Phase of Modern Warfare by Thomas Neely
The United States Army in Afghanistan, October 2001 - March 2002: Operation Enduring Freedom by Richard W. Stewart
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress by Catherine Dale
National Will to Fight: Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Don't by Michael McNerney