The 1st Infantry Division in Sicily: a case study in tactical intelligenceThis case study examines how, and to what effect, the 1st Infantry Division used tactical intelligence to support its amphibious assault during the first phase of the Sicily Campaign in 1943. Close scrutiny of field orders, intelligence estimates, and message traffic reveals that the unit’s tactical intelligence effort, led by the G-2, shaped military decision-making by the division commander and other leaders during this critical initial operation of the invasion. This study concludes that these decisions directly impacted the division’s successful five-day fight to secure and break out from its expeditionary beachhead. Moreover, the analysis attached to this detailed examination of the 1st Infantry Division’s experience in Sicily adds insight into some of the more enduring challenges and opportunities associated with the art and science of expeditionary tactical intelligence operations. In particular, it highlights both the beneficial capabilities of the overarching Allied intelligence enterprise as well as its limitations and susceptibility to disruption amid the fog, friction, and chaos of ground combat.
Consolidating gains in large-scale combat operations: Operation HuskyOperation Husky remains a significant example of the trials and tribulations of large-scale combat operations (LSCO) during World War II. The Allied force initial assault consisted of more than seven divisions, preceded by two airborne divisions coming ashore simultaneously along a front of one hundred miles. Operation Husky would eventually become the largest and most dispersed amphibious assault with the Seventh Army being the first US field army to fight as a unit in World War II. The Seventh Army's success in Operation Husky was attributed to the initiative of aggressive commanders and soldiers and the Seventh Army's ability through effective Civil Affairs Officers (CAO) and American Military Government (AMG) operations to quickly consolidate gains. The area security and stability tasks accomplished in the consolidation area contributed significantly to Allied success in Sicily. The Italian Fascist government under Mussolini began to crumble under the weight of Allied pressure. Increased civilian unrest, scattered enemy remnants fighting in the rear area, staggering numbers of prisoners of war, and threats of counterattack penetrations became a concern that General George S. Patton (Seventh Army Commander) and his Division commanders planned for and reduced in execution. The lessons learned during Operation Husky were applied to the follow-up operation in Normandy one year later, and still apply today. Given a renewed emphasis on LSCO, this paper examines how consolidation area operations during Operation Husky added to the cumulative effects required for success in LSCO. This paper will address elements of operational art that were most significantly improved because of effective consolidation area operations: operational reach, tempo, and phasing and transitions. The research and findings from this paper will assist future commanders and operational planners in planning for large-scale combat operations.
Division cavalry in Sicily: the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in Operation Husky, July-August 1943As the U.S. Army takes steps towards transitioning from a brigade-centric to a division-centric organization, this study draws lessons from a Division Cavalry squadron in Large-Scale Combat Operations. It follows the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (CRS) during Operation HUSKY-the liberation of Sicily from Axis control in July and August 1943- as they performed a variety of reconnaissance, security, and direct action missions. It concludes that division cavalry squadrons are essential to success in large-scale ground combat operations. It demonstrates the key role mechanized cavalry played in highlighting the importance of fighting as a combined arms team. Furthermore, engineers in particular proved to be a critical asset needed to enable the 91st CRS to achieve its maximum effectiveness. Fourth and finally, this study shows that the 91st CRS was capable of performing a dizzying variety of missions, yet it was most effective while performing the traditional cavalry missions of reconnaissance and security.
Great escape: an analysis of allied actions leading to the axis evacuation of Sicily in World War IIAs Allied armies advanced in North Africa, Allied leadership established Sicily as the next target. As the invasion unfolded, the Allies pushed Axis forces into northeastern Sicily where a well-organized evacuation moved over 100,000 Axis troops, with equipment, to the Italian mainland. The central research question is: Did an opportunity exist for the Allies to trap and compel the capitulation of Axis forces during the Sicily campaign? Analysis of the invasion decision, the planning cycle, and the operation resulted in several conclusions. First, strategic guidance adequately promoted successful planning. Second, operational planning was disjointed and lacked senior ground commander involvement. Finally, Generals Eisenhower and Alexander did not communicate to their field army commanders a campaign strategic vision or commander's intent, which led to two decisions that eliminated the possibility to trap Axis forces. Additionally, the newness of combined operational practices and differences in command relationships caused coordination problems that hindered operational responsiveness. Though Sicily was a tactical success, the Allies missed an opportunity to capture a substantial Axis force, which demonstrates the importance of commander's vision and intent, cultivating unity of command in an allied environment and preserving the ability to exploit favorable conditions with an eye toward operational goals.
Lieutenant General Patton's Seventh Army in Sicily 1943: the maturation of an American operational artistThe Sicilian Campaign, codenamed Operation HUSKY, lasted from 10 July to 17 August 1943, and was an important evolutionary step in George S. Patton's maturation as an operational artist. The study of his operational art in Sicily leads to two questions. How did Patton's experience during the Sicilian Campaign influence his ability to understand an operational environment and accurately visualize operations? Furthermore, how did Patton's personal and professional military development prepare him for operations in Sicily? Patton's personal and professional development enabled him to visualize the Seventh Army's advance on Palermo and Messina (the strategic objective in Sicily) prior to the Allied invasion of Sicily, despite his initial limited role in the campaign. In Sicily, Patton's ability to understand and visualize operations allowed him to deviate from the original Allied operational plan to rearrange tactical actions in time and space to seize Messina using several of the elements of operational art. The analysis of Patton's operational art in Sicily considers his professional military development and the Seventh Army's participation in Operation HUSKY during the planning and execution of the campaign. Patton's personal and professional officer education provided a knowledge base grounded in theory, history, and doctrine. The practical application of his education during his training and operational experiences further developed Patton's ability to understand and visualize operations. Patton used his training and operational experiences in the Mexican Punitive Expedition, World War One, and the interwar maneuvers to develop an understanding for what are now called the elements of operational art. From these experiences Patton gained an appreciation for tempo, operational reach, culmination, lines of operation, basing, and risk which he experimented with throughout his early development. This understanding, nurtured through Patton's early professional development, generated the knowledge required for him to effectively visualize operations during the planning and execution of Operation HUSKY. Patton's command of the Seventh Army was exceptional, and it represented over thirty-four years of preparation both personally and professionally as an operational artist. During Operation HUSKY Patton utilized his prior experience to execute combined arms operations and employed select elements of operational art to achieve the decisive point of his campaign, the seizure of Palermo. Patton exhibited his most substantial growth as an operational artist with his ability to understand and visualize both the actions of an enemy force and his own operational approach.
Operation Husky: operational art in large formation combined arms maneuverOperation Husky, the Allied World War II invasion of Sicily, featured the clash of an Allied Army Group against an Axis Army. The Allied 15th Army Group was composed of fourteen divisions -- an impressive total when one considers that combined, the United States and British Armies only have twelve active duty divisions today. Further, the Axis were a formidable opponent who skillfully employed combined arms maneuver, aggressively attacked the 15th Army Group, and contested Allied air superiority. In light of the United States Army's decade long focus on wide area security, this monograph examines Operation Husky through the lens of the elements of operational art to draw out lessons for modern planners who are changing their focus to large formation combined arms maneuver. The Allies skillfully incorporated lines of operation, decisive points, operational reach, basing, culmination, and risk. However, they poorly employed the elements of center of gravity, tempo, and phasing, which arguably allowed much of the Axis Army to retrograde to Italy in good order. The reason for this poor employment was poor planning. Therefore this monograph recommends that large scale combined arms maneuver operations be completely planned prior to execution, that there is a deliberate plan to plan, that the planning is fully resourced, and finally, that planners integrate all domains, land, sea, air, space, and cyber, in their application of operational art. Operation Husky is a rich depository of vicarious experience in large scale combined arms maneuver for today's field grad officers.
Operation Husky: seeking an operational approach to decisive victoryOver the course of thirty-eight days, the Allies successfully took possession of Sicily and claimed a tactical victory. However, the Axis forces won a moral victory by opposing a numerically superior foe while preserving a significant portion of their fighting force. Military historians lament the Axis evacuation and the Allied failure to destroy the German and Italian armies in Sicily. The obvious question is why were the Allies unable to achieve a decisive victory. To determine why the German and Italian forces escaped Sicily it was necessary to investigate both the planning for Husky and the subsequent campaign. First, to reveal the decisions that led to the invasion of Sicily and shaped the operational design the research examined the documents emanating from the inter-allied strategic conferences. The historical documents contain the strategic objectives and operational design prescribed by the Allied strategic leaders for the operation. Second, it was necessary to review the historical doctrine most likely available to the planners for Operation Husky. Reviewing historical doctrine reveals the military instructions that guided how planners translated the guidance and directives from strategic leaders into a plan of action. Finally, it was necessary to compare current joint doctrine with the historical doctrine to identify relevant operational factors that contributed to the Allied inability to achieve decisive victory during the operation. Current doctrine, being more mature, reveals doctrinal planning elements that 1943 planners did not identify and provides insights into historical data and accounts of the campaign. Additionally, the comparison of historical and current doctrine reveals key elements of current doctrine that were present in the historical doctrine, albeit expressed differently, but that both contemporary leaders and planners did not properly understand or apply. The research found that the strategic guidance was wanting. The Allies failed to destroy Axis forces because the strategic guidance was vague and did not provide a clear vision of the end state of the campaign. Operational level commanders did not attempt to correct the shortfalls in strategic guidance either. The doctrine of the period was adequate although it did not directly address formulation of an operational approach. However, the planners chose the center of gravity incorrectly. Thus, the actions taken by the Allies once ashore were not able to either fix the enemy forces or isolate those forces from their route of withdrawal. The Allies were able to seize Sicily but the Axis forces were able to escape.
Operations Mercury and Husky: contemporary art of operations and their relevance for operational artAccording to current United States (US) Army doctrine, operational art fulfills a bridging role to pursue strategic objectives throughout the arrangement of tactical action in time, space, and purpose. The German Wehrmacht and the US Army as part of the Allies applied their contemporary art of operations in the complex testbed of World War II successfully. By comparing the doctrinal frameworks, this monograph raises the initial research questions about a comparable doctrinal perception to today's sophisticated understanding. This enables the utilization of three lenses – intent, synchronization, and risk – to evaluate the application of an art of operations during the Operations Mercury (1941) and Husky (1943). Although both operations were successful, they achieved their objectives at high costs and faced significant impediments. This monograph argues for a comparability of the contemporary and the current concepts of operational art. The German Wehrmacht and the US Army applied similar characteristics and principles without having a cohesive doctrinal understanding. The use of the lenses revealed that both armies utilized a constrained application and rarely exploited the potential of their art of operations. Operation Mercury was a reflection of German operational skills and their art of operations that highlights the relation to cognitive efforts and the intent. Furthermore, it emphasized the adaptability of the German Wehrmacht utilizing their leadership philosophy to adapt quickly to emerging challenges. Nevertheless, poor synchronization and less prioritized logistical and intelligence aspects had a negative influence. Operation Husky highlighted the impediments of indecisive leadership, vague political guidance, inter- and intra-service rivalry, and an only partially filled role of an operational artist. This affected the dialogue between strategic leaders and operational actors about the cognitive effort negatively. Subsequently, ambiguous or wanting guidance resulted in a disconnected operational approach that missed multiple opportunities to exploit chances. The recommendations are based on these outcomes: first, the emphasis on the strategic dialogue to create a more appropriate intent and identify critical leadership requirements for the operational artist; second, the increasing tensions between synchronization and flexibility of military action.
Prelude to multidomain operations: joint fires in shaping amphibious landings in North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy in World War TwoAmphibious operations are complex combat operations requiring the skillful integration of joint fires to facilitate inland maneuver by ground forces. The Second World War saw many amphibious operations on the part of the Allies. This study looks at three vignettes from the European Theater of Operations; the amphibious invasions of North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy to better understand the progression of joint fires planning, training, and execution. The level of joint fires integration progressed remarkably over the course of the war as the Allies applied lessons learned across the joint force including lessons from the Pacific Theater of Operations. The Allies used both lethal and non-lethal fires across multiple domains to gain access to contested shores. These lessons may prove useful as modern armed forces face increasingly sophisticated anti-access area denial networks.
