Headquarters XII AFSC, report, Operation "Dragoon" [XII Air Service Command]The purpose of this document is to present a graphic picture of the operation "Dragoon" in sufficient detail so that others with field experience will be able to understand and use if applicable, the information contained herein. An effort has been made not only to indicate what was done but also to indicate why it was done and the reasoning behind the decisions that were made. It covers the planning and actual operational activities of the XII Air Force Service Command in the supply and service to an air force in support of an invasion and advancing army.
History of M.A.A.F., December 1943 - 1 September 1944 [Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces]This narrative comprises Part I of the history of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces covering from December 10, 1943 until September 1, 1944. Chapters 1 through 11 include the origin, structure and organization of MAAF, and operations narrative of Anzio, bombardment of Cassino, Operations Strangle and Diadem, and the invasion of southern France.
Impact : vol. 2, no. 10., October, 1944Contents: Use of Rockets; 14th AF in China; 7th AF at Saipan; Palau, Philippines, N.E.I.; Holland Airborne Invasion; GAF Strike at Poltava; Ploesti Ground Photos; Southern France Invasion; Newest Attempts of GAF; Jap Steel; Tail Warning Radar; Wrecked Hun Hangers.
Medium bomber operations, 1 January--28 August 1944. [Headquarters Twelfth Air Force]The following work is a study of the operations of medium bombers under the Twelfth Air Force during the period of 1 January 1944 through 28 August 1944 and presents a survey of activities, versatility of efforts, and demonstration of the decisive part played.
Troop carrier operations 1944 [Headquarters Twelfth Air Foce]The 51st Troop Carrier Wing in 1944 played a most significant part in operations both in the Mediterranean and the China-Burma-India theater of operations. This report presents a survey of their activities, showing the wide variation on the range of their efforts. The document details the organization and locations of units, Balkan operations (planning, phasing, tactics), operations in C.B.I. (living conditions, tactics, upper Burma, IMFHAL Valley operations), paratroop operations (January-June 1944), operations in France, Greece, and Italy (Operation Dragoon, resupply, Operation Manna), as well as routine operations.
XII Air Force Service Command in Operation 'Dragoon.'Letter by Major Benjamin Chidlaw: The securing and supply of a beachhead is one of the most difficult feats of warfare. The invasion of Southern France not only presented the usual problems connected with a landing operation but, in addition, presented the problem of supporting a rapidly advancing front within a relatively short time after the landings had been accomplished. The story of how the XII Air Force Service Command within Southern France alone transported, supplied, and maintained the Twelfth Air Force indicates that with proper planning and coordination an Air Force is capable of maintaining and supplying itself in a rapidly changing situation.
Allied Force Headquarters & Combined Chiefs of Staff
Combined Chiefs of Staff 465: firm recommendations with regard to operations "Anvil" and "Overlord"The matter of arriving at firm decisions with regard to Overlord and Anvil is pressing. If delayed much longer it will definitely interfere with the preparation of forces and will jeopardize meeting the target dates. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force and the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean, confer and submit their recommendations by February 1.
Operation "Anvil" [Allied Force Headquarters, Office of the Commander-in-Chief]The attached report of General Eisenhower is circulated for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The outline plan embraces two plans: a. one based upon the assumption that assault craft and shipping for two divisions will be available as now allocated; and b. a second based upon the assumption that this allocation will be increased sufficiently to permit of an assault by three divisions. Section I- appreciation. Section II- outline plan. Section III- list of annexes.
Armies
G-2 History: Seventh Army operations in Europe, 15 August 1944 - 8 May 1945This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.
It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army Operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.
Seventh Army History, invasion Southern France, phase oneOn 19 December 1943, Seventh Army Headquarters in Palermo received a message which interrupted a four-month period of comparative inactivity since the end of the Sicilian campaign. It was a telegram from Allied Force Headquarters: "An estimate is required as a matter of urgency as to the accommodations which you would require for your planning staffs should you be asked to undertake the planning of an operation of a similar size to Husky…" Chapters include: preliminary planning; the target area and German defense plans; final planning; training; moving to the assault; the VI Corps assault; and annexes.
Seventh Army History, phase twoChapter VII: the capture of Toulon and Marseille. Chapter VIII: the German retreat from southern France. Chapter IX: the battle of Montelimar. Chapter X: protecting the eastern plain/flank. Chapter XI: consolidation of Seventh Army gains. Chapter XII: the junction of Dragoon and Overlord. Chapter XIII: the Moselle. Chapter XIV: problems of rapid advance. Included are various annexes with charts detailing Dragoon area build-up (projected and actual cargo tonnage- cumulatively), projected and actual number of vehicles, projected and actual strength, projected and actual ammunition tonnage, projected and actual petroleum tonnage, a map of supply dumps and phase lines (D-Day through September), and a map of Germany.
Battle experiences, coordination of various arms [Headquarters, VI Corps]Successful employment of combined arms has been an outstanding accomplishment of American forces throughout the course of the war. The VI (Army) Corps with three assault landings, Salerno, Anzio, and southern France, to its credit, and 524 days of combat in Italy, France, Germany, and Austria, has had considerable experience in the coordination of ground, naval, and air forces directed towards the successful culmination of a military operation. To illustrate the methods and techniques employed in affecting coordination, two operations, the Meurthe River crossing on 20 November 1944 and the southern France assault landing on 15 August 1944 will be discussed in detail.
Field Order No. 1, Operation Anvil VI CorpsMission VI Corps (KODAK Force). On D day H hour assaults simultaneously beaches from CAP CAVAMIRE to AGAY employing three divisions abreast, destroys enemy beach defenses, and advances rapidly inland to contact RUGBY Force , ROMEO Force, and ROSIE Force; extends beachhead rapidly to BLUE Line , and after reorganization continues adv to W and NW; secures airfield sites in the ARGENS VALLEY between FREJUS and LE LUC from observed enemy arty fire ; after passage of lines by GARBO Force, continues adv within zone; protects Army R during assault and subsequent adv; captures LE MUY on D day; releases RUGBY Force , ROMEO Force, ROSIE Force, and CC SUDRE to Army control on Army order.
FO 26 HQ RCT 142, 3 August 1944, Operation DragoonSections include: intelligence; G-2 estimate; order of battle index- organic units of German divisions in Southern France; movement tables; tactical study of terrain; beach reports; personnel assignment by ships; smoke plan, obstacle clearance; etc.
Photographic operations, MAPRW, of southern France prior to D-DayThis document details mapping and reconnaissance of southern France by the Mediterranean Allied Photographic Reconnaissance Wing starting July 1943. Included is a document by Headquarters, XII Tactical Air Command, 31 July 1944, annex no. 13 to operations order no. 1 on air reconnaissance and spotting. Sections include: TAC/R; naval gunfire spotting; artillery adjustment; and general.
Photo recon for MATAF and 15th Army Group, 3rd Photo GroupThis document was produced by the Third Photo Group in order to promote a better understanding of photo reconnaissance and to present the system and developments which have evolved out of their experiences. The report presents a survey of the extent and variety of the photographic intelligence supplied through the efforts of this group. It is hoped that this account will point up the importance of its role in relationship with air and ground operations and the problems and dangers that it faced in the accomplishment of its missions. Table of contents: photographic intelligence; photo recon planning; weather; typical photo recon squadron; support of 5th Army; oblique and 'dicing' missions; 12th Air Force Photo Center (941st Engineers Aviation, 3rd Photographic Technical Squadron); support of amphibious operation- invasion of Southern France; night photography; and common questions and answers about photo recon.
Logistics
Ammo Joe's march from the Gothic Line to victoryThis historical report entitled "Ammo Joe's March from the Gothic Line to Victory" constitutes the final written chapter of the last of three principle phases in the twenty month long Italian campaign. Previous reports published by the Ammunition Section, Headquarters, Fifth Army, are: "Ammo Joe's Advance on Rome," and "Ammo Joe at Anzio." The report of the Rome campaign includes the three month period between 301800A April 1944 to 311800B July 1944. Since the Gothic Line campaign report covers the period between 241800A September 1944 to 251800B April 1945 there is a lapse of several weeks between the Rome report and this one. In these few weeks between "Ammo Joe" editions the Allied armies continued to move northward. The Arno River was bridged at Florence and after a six weeks siege the city fell to the Allies. This was also a period of reorganization, regrouping, and consolidation of freshly gained positions in the large area between Pisa and Florence. At this time, too, there was considerable redeployment of Fifth Army troops to help in the impending invasion of Southern France. These weeks saw the Germans continuing to retreat but with a growing intensity in their opposition. Our advance was being hampered by their energetic rear guard action, thus enabling the Germans to build strong fortifications in the almost impregnable fortress of the north—the Apennine Range.
U.S Army transportation in the European Theater of Operations, 1942-1945Because of the close interrelationship of strategy and logistics, and because of the size and the importance of the western European campaign, students of military affairs will long find it profitable to search out sources of information on the significance of transportation to the United States Army in invading France and cracking the renowned Siegfried Line. The present monograph can be considered only a preliminary study of the role of transportation, and the work of the Transportation Corps in building up American personnel and materiel strength in the British Isles, mounting the United States forces for the amphibious assaults on Normandy and southern France, and supporting the Allied advance into the heart of Germany. The monograph was prepared during a period of several months prior to July 1946, when an increasing amount of primary and secondary historical material was becoming available in the War Department. Table of contents: commencing Transportation Corps operations in the British Isles; initial port operations and revised planning; shipping and the Bolero buildup – 1943-1944; U.S. preparations in the U.K for Overlord (parts I and II); preparations for the amphibious assault; the amphibious assault on Normandy; beach and port discharge operations- Cherbourg; motor transport and railway operations; expanded operations on the continent; logistical support from Southern France; line of communication and Transportation Corps supply operations in Northern Europe; programming continental movements; and implementing the supply movement program. Also included in this document are maps and charts.
Invasion of Southern France: report of naval commander, Western Task ForcePart I of this report is concerned with the overall planning for the invasion of Southern France; part II is the execution of the plan. Planning (decision, formulation of planned action, assignment of task organizations) and execution of the plan (campaign narrative, intelligence, operations, air, gunnery, material, logistics, communications, medical department operations) are detailed.
Operation Dragoon- debarkation from Port of NaplesThe control aspect of embarkation procedures is one that cannot be too strongly emphasized nor its importance exaggerated in the mounting of a large-scale operation such as the one described herein. The control developed by the embarkation group concerned with the mounting of 7th Army forces from the Port of Naples for the invasion of Southern France is noteworthy and will be the one discussed in this outline. Commencing with the time a unit is notified by Task Force Headquarters to prepare for movement to the staging areas for embarkation until the time that the unit actually embarks, the control maintained by the embarkation group must never be relaxed in order that the success of the operation will not be impaired or jeopardized. In preparing for the invasion of Southern France, it was planned that the mounting of the large majority of the troops involved (7th Army augmented and reinforced) would take place from the Port of Naples, Italy. The responsibility for the reception, staging and embarkation of these units was placed on the Commanding General, Communications Zone (formerly SOS NATOUSA) MTOUSA. Headings include an introduction, formation of the embarkation group, control instructions and forms, and a summary.
Various
Interview with Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson, Engineer of the 7th Army. Report no. 209, 12 January 1945Source: Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson, West Point graduate 1927- served in Corps of Engineers and as Engineer of the 7th Army. Section I- background of source. Section II- information of interest to the engineers (bridging equipment, electrical generating equipment, snow removal equipment, tank dozer, bulldozers, mobile crane, landing strips for cub and L-5 planes, availability of spare parts, mine laying and clearing equipment, use of war dogs, and military training). Section III- information of interest to the Army Ground Forces (experimental stations, replacement system, rotation policy, organization of engineer units, and technical reports- time of request). Section IV- information of interest to the Director, Plans and Operations (reduction of basics, items of clothing- steel helmet strap, condition of material upon arrival in the theater, use of materials available locally, standardized items reaching the theater, shortage of supply- ammunition, equipment issued to the French, and condition of highways in southern France).
Report, Army Ground Forces Board MTO, number A-243.Dissemination Division, G-2 Section, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, Army War College; Holmer, H. W. Observer's note: The following outline of the organization for, operation of, and lessons learned from the amphibious operations for the landing of the Seventh Army in Southern France were obtained from the Engineer Section, Seventh Army, the 540th Engineer Combat Regiment, and the 36th Engineer Combat Regiment. The engineer units involved had taken part in prior landings, except the 48th Engineer Combat Battalion which was attached to the 540th Engineer Combat Regiment. It was the fifth amphibious operation of the latter unit. All the comments received indicated that this operation went off more smoothly than any prior landing. Many of these comments were from officers who had engaged in four previous landing operations. It is believed that for this reason the organization setup and the lessons learned are worthy of considerable study.