United States Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1941 by
This study presents an in-depth survey of the principal policies and personalities of American diplomacy of the era, together with a discussion of recent historiography in the field. For two decades between the two world wars, America pursued a foreign policy course that was, according to Rhodes, shortsighted and self-centered. Believing World War I had been an aberration, Americans na^Dively signed disarmament treaties and a pact renouncing war, while eschewing such inconveniences as enforcement machinery or participation in international organizations. Smug moral superiority, a penurious desire to save money, and naíveté ultimately led to the neglect of America's armed forces even as potential rivals were arming themselves to the teeth. In contrast to the dynamic drive of the New Deal in domestic policy, foreign policy under Franklin D. Roosevelt was often characterized by a lack of clarity and, reflecting Roosevelt's fear of isolationists and pacifists, by presidential explanations that were frequently evasive, incomplete, or deliberately misleading. One of the period's few successes was the bipartisan Good Neighbor policy, which proved far-sighted commercially and strategically. Rhodes praises Cordell Hull as the outstanding secretary of state of the time, whose judgment was often more on target than others in the State Department and the executive branch.
Britain and Interwar Danubian Europe by
Danubian Europe presented constant and serious security risks for European peace and stability and, for that reason, contrary to conventional wisdom, it commanded the attention of British diplomacy with a view to appeasing local conflicts. Britain and Interwar Danubian Europe examines the manner in which the Foreign Office perceived and treated the antagonism between the Little Entente, comprised of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania, and Hungary, on the one hand, and revisionist Bulgaria and her neighbours in the Balkans, on the other, and the impact that these local conflicts had in connection with Franco-Italian rivalry in Central/South-Eastern Europe. With Hitler's accession to power, Danubian Europe was viewed in Whitehall in relation to its place in the prospective policy for preserving Austrian independence and containing German aggression. Dragan Bakic argues that the British approach to security problems in Danubian Europe had certain permanent features which stemmed from the general British outlook on the new successor states -the members of the Little Entente- founded on the ruins of the Habsburg monarchy. This book shows that it was the lack of confidence in their stability and permanence, as well as the misperceptions about the motives and intentions of the policies pursued by other Powers towards Central/South-Eastern Europe, which accounted for the apparent sluggishness and ineffectiveness of the Foreign Office's dealings with security challenges. Based on extensive, original archival research, this is a fascinating volume for any historian keen to know more about the 20th-century history of East-Central Europe or British foreign policy in the interwar years.
Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period by
This comprehensive, up-to-date analysis of Japanese policy between the two world wars utilizes both English and Japanese sources to present Japan as an independent agent, not a state whose policy was determined by the actions of other countries. Beginning with Japan's disappointment with the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919, Nish examines the roots of Japanese discontent and feelings that ambitions in China were being unreasonably restrained. He explains British and American policies in the region as reactive, but concludes that their responses helped to determine which factions would dominate Japan's political arena. This non-partisan account is even-handed in apportioning responsibility for the events leading to the Second World War. While some Japanese politicians in the 1920s tried to follow the international path, there were others who tended to side with the army in establishing Japan's position, first in Manchuria and later in North and Central China in the 1930s. Conscious of the nation's unpopularity in the western world, Japan allied itself with Germany and Italy in the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 and the Tripartite Alliance of 1940. To pursue its own national objectives, Japan joined her allies in making war on the United States and the colonial empires of Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Its forces succeeded in overrunning many colonial territories; and, with a view to easing the problems of occupying them, Japan liberalized its harsh military policies, granting independence to Burma and the Philippines and welcoming Asian leaders to Tokyo for the Greater East Asian Conference of November 1943.
British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars by 
The Seeds of Disaster by
An examination of the military doctrine that animated the French defense against the German invasion in 1940.
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period by
In 1914, the armies and navies that faced each other were alike right down to the strengths of their companies and battalions and the designs of their battleships and cruisers. Differences were of degree rather than essence. During the interwar period, however, the armed forces grew increasingly asymmetrical, developing different approaches to the same problems. This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in exploitation by the seven major military powers. The comparative essays investigate how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explain much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II. The essays focus on several instances of how military services developed new technology and weapons and incorporated them into their doctrine, organisation and styles of operations.
The Roots of Blitzkrieg by
Following Germany's defeat in World War I, the Germans signed the Versailles Treaty, superficially agreeing to limit their war powers. The Allies envisioned the future German army as a lightly armed border guard and international security force. The Germans had other plans. As early as 1919, James Corum contends, the tactical foundations were being laid for the Nazi Blitzkrieg. Between 1919 and 1933, German military leaders created and nurtured the Reichswehr, a new military organization built on the wreckage of the old Imperial Army. It was not being groomed for policing purposes. Focusing on Hans von Seeckt, General Staff Chief and Army Commander, Corum traces the crucial transformations in German military tactical doctrine, organization, and training that laid the foundations for fighting Germany's future wars. In doing so, he restores balance to prior assessment of von Seeckt's influence and demonstrates how the general, along with a few other "visionary" officers--including armor tactician Ernst Volckheim and air tactician Helmut Wilberg--collaborated to develop the core doctrine for what became the Blitzkrieg. The concepts of mobile war so essential to Germany's strength in World War II, Corum shows, were in place well before the tools became available. As an unforeseen consequence of the Versailles Treaty, the Germans were not saddled with a stockpile of outdated equipment as the Allies were. This, ironically, resulted in an advantage for the Germans, who were able to create doctrine first and design equipment to match it.
Risings and Rebellions 1919-39 by
An earlier volume in this series covered Small Wars and Skirmishes 1902-18. The present volume extends coverage of such 'small wars' to the interwar years of 1919-39. After a hiatus during the Great War, when resources were diverted elsewhere, the earlier colonial incursions were followed in the 1920s and 1930s by a process of consolidation involving campaigns against emerging resistance movements, many of which owed their strength to religious fanaticism. Major nationalist leaders such as Abd el-Krim in Morocco and Omar al-Mukhtar in Libya emerged from 1920 onwards, and the spark provided by their resistance to foreign control lit the flame of post-1945 independence movements. The title of this volume, Risings and Rebellions 1919-39, reflects the change in emphasis compared with the earlier colonial campaigns. Indeed, the sheer scale of such wars as the risings against the French and Spanish forces in Morocco and the Italian re-conquest of Libya takes them out of the category of 'small wars' altogether. A book such as this cannot hope to cover all the civil disturbances, emergencies, outright revolts, insurrections, insurgencies, rebellions and campaigns of passive resistance that occurred against the colonial powers over a period of two decades. What it does attempt to do is to illustrate the main types of campaign involved, the organization of forces, the effects of new weaponry, and the tactics that the indigenous peoples used to counter the technology of the colonial invader, particularly by applying their local knowledge of some of the most difficult terrain in the world. In most cases at least one battle or skirmish is described in some detail in order to give a flavour of the significant factors involved. Sketch maps are provided to indicate the main campaigns and illustrations show the uniforms or tribal dress of the combatants. Small wars and insurgencies did not, of course, end when Imperialism gave way to independence movements. They continued as incursions by more powerful neighboring states once the colonial powers had departed the scene (East Timor, Tibet, Western Sahara) or as civil wars, often arising from ethnic conflicts caused by the artificial boundaries created by the former colonial powers (Angola, Dar Fur, India/Pakistan, Indo-China, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Zaire). Nor is any end in sight - the lessons of history take a long time to learn, if indeed they are ever learnt. The present volume includes appendices on weaponry and equipment, mechanized vehicles, communications, and the use of aircraft, armored cars and tanks in suppressing risings and rebellions. Each section of the text and the appendices is intended to be self-contained but concludes with a select bibliography in case readers wish to go back to original sources or to seek more detail on particular campaigns.
Winning the Next War by
How and when do military innovations take place? Do they proceed differently during times of peace and times of war? In Winning the Next War, Stephen Peter Rosen argues that armies and navies are not forever doomed to "fight the last war." Rather, they are able to respond to shifts in the international strategic situation. He also discusses the changing relationship between the civilian innovator and the military bureaucrat. In peacetime, Rosen finds, innovation has been the product of analysis and the politics of military promotion, in a process that has slowly but successfully built military capabilities critical to American military success. In wartime, by contrast, innovation has been constrained by the fog of war and the urgency of combat needs. Rosen draws his principal evidence from U.S. military policy between 1905 and 1960, though he also discusses the British army's experience with the battle tank during World War I.
To Fight or Not to Fight? by
Provides a narrative analysis of US Army reconnaissance, scout, and cavalry evolution from the post-World War I era through the Iraqi conflict. It outlines key developments in the concepts governing reconnaissance units from the armored cavalry regiment down to the maneuver battalion scout platoon. These changes are placed in the context of national defense policy decisions and major Army initiatives. The title derives from the almost cyclic shifts between reconnaissance organizations oriented on information collection and those designed for a broader mission set. The text focuses on doctrinal and organizational changes, but training, materiel development, and the impact of combat operations constitute important supporting themes. This study also traces the transition from horse to vehicular reconnaissance, later bolstered by air cavalry and more recently with a variety of sensors and unmanned systems.
Military Misfortunes by
Why do competent armies fail? What made the 1915 British-led invasion of Gallipoli one of the bloodiest catastrophes of the First World War? How did a dozen German U-Boats manage to humiliate the U.S. navy for nine months in 1942, sinking an average of 650,000 tons of shipping monthly? Why was the sophisticated Israeli intelligence service so thoroughly surprised by the onslaught of combined Arab armies during the Yom Kippur War of 1973? MILITARY MISFORTUNES, written by the prominent American strategic analyst, Eliot Cohen and British historian John Gooch, has become the classic, standard answer to these recurring conundrums. Cohen and Gooch's theory of defeat combines gripping battlefield narratives with an innovative look at the hidden factors that undermine armies and lead otherwise well-equipped nations to stunning defeat. It is a must read for anyone who hopes to avoid the same fate.
To Change an Army by
Harold Winton's biographical study of the role of a progressive thinker who approached the issue of armored doctrine with a moderate's concern for achieving what could be achieved rather than what the visionaries dreamed of is a valuable reminder that we must practice the art of the possible. Many factors internal to an army and external to it affect how doctrine and its supporting equipment is developed.
The motor-mechanization program of the Red Army during the interwar years / by
Traces the course of the motorization and mechanization of the Red Army during the decade of the 1930's.
Billy Mitchell's War with the Navy by
When Billy Mitchell returned from WWI, he brought with him the deep-seated belief that air power had made navies obsolete. However, in the years following WWI, the U.S. Congress was far more interested in disarmament and isolationist policies than in funding national defense. For the military services this meant lean budgets and skeleton operating forces. Billy Mitchell's War with the Navy recounts the intense political struggle between the Army and Navy air arms for the limited resources needed to define and establish the role of aviation within their respective services in the period between the two world wars. After Congress rejected the concept of a unified air service in 1920, Mitchell and his supporters turned on the Navy, seeking to substitute the Air Service as the nation's first line of defense. While Mitchell proved that aircraft could sink a battleship with the bombing of the Ostfriesland in 1921, he was unable to convince the General Staff of the Army, the General Board of the Navy, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or Congress of the need for an independent air force. When Mitchell turned to the pen to discredit the Navy, he was convicted by his own words and actions in a court-martial that captivated the nation, and was forced to resign in 1925. Rather than ending the rivalry for air power, Mitchell's resignation set the stage for the ongoing dispute between the two services in the years immediately before WWII. After Mitchell's resignation, the rivalry for air power between the two services resurfaced when the Navy's plans to procure torpedo planes for the defense of Pearl Harbor and Coco Solo were brought to the attention of the Army. The book concludes with a description of the events surrounding the Air Corps' abysmal performance at Pearl Harbor and Midway followed by a critical assessment of how the development of aviation was pursued by the Army and the Navy after WWII.
The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar Period by
Joseph Moretz's innovative work focuses on what battleships actually did in the inter-war years and what its designed war role in fact was. In doing so, the book tells us much about British naval policy and planning of the time. Drawing heavily on official Admiralty records and private papers of leading officers, the author examines the navy's operational experience and the evolution of its tactical doctrine during the interwar period. He argues that operational experience, combined with assumptions about the nature of a future naval war, were more important in keeping the battleship afloat than conservatism in Navy.
Encyclopedia of the Interwar Years by
As the new century dawns, curricular and popular interest is increasingly focused on understanding the historical events and forces that have driven the vast changes in the twentieth century. And the period between the two world wars, one replete with artistic inspiration, economic enterprise, intellectual commentary and analysis, and political wrangling, witnessed much of this change. Focusing primarily on the United States and Western Europe, Encyclopedia of the Interwar Years is an interdisciplinary reference to the ideas, people, places, and eventsmilitary, political, and culturalof the period between the two wars. With 50 black-and-white photographs, this is a consistent and comprehensive guide for any reader interested in understanding the dynamics and development of this period. Coverage includes: Biographies, including political leaders, social workers, actors, composers, athletes, writers, criminals, film directors, artists, industrialists, and playwrights Movements, including Art Deco, the Bloomsbury Group, Colonialism, Fascism, The Lost Generation, Moral Re-Armament, Nazism, Protectionism, and Surrealism Legislation and court cases, including the Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924, the Child Labor Act, the Federal Securities Act, the Government of India Act, the Immigration Act of 1924, and the Scopes Monkey Trial Events, meetings, and conferences, including the Black Sox Scandal, the Boulogne Conference, the Hindenberg, the League of Nations, and British, German, and U.S. elections Treaties, agreements, and policies, including the Treaty of Berlin, the Five-Year Plan, the Four-Power Treaty, and the Geneva Disarmament Conference Organizations and agencies, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Hays Office, and the Works Progress Administration Entertainment and popular culture, including The Battleship Potemkin, the Algonquin Round Table, The Blue Angel, Frankenstein, The Jazz Singer, Life magazine, cartoons, motion pictures, and radio.
Interwar Years by
An exciting series that covers selected topics from the Higher Level options in the IB History syllabus. This coursebook covers Higher Level option 5, Topic 8, Interwar Years: Conflict and Cooperation 1919-39. The text is divided into clear sections following the IB syllabus structure and content specifications. It offers a sound historical account along with detailed explanations and analysis, and an emphasis on historical debate to prepare students for the in-depth, extended essay required in the Paper 3 examination. It also provides plenty of exam practice including student answers with examiner's comments, simplified mark schemes and practical advice on approaching the Paper 3 examination.
The British in Interwar Germany by
The British in Interwar Germany analyses the British presence in Germany from the armistice until the end of the Rhineland occupation in 1930. It looks at British involvement in the Rhineland, Danzig, Upper Silesia, Schleswig and East Prussia and on the inter-Allied Control Commissions (IAMCC), which were supervising German disarmament. Drawing widely on a range of primary sources, David Williamson explores the problems facing British military and civil officials, their attitudes towards the Germans and their relations with their allies - particularly the French. The book also examines the everyday lives of the British soldiers and administrators in Germany and their interaction with the Germans, with particular attention being paid to the city of Cologne and the British colony that developed there. This new edition brings David Williamson's study fully up-to-date and now contains a greater coverage of the relevant social history, as well as maps, illustrations and a useful glossary. The British in Interwar Germany will be of great interest to students and scholars of Weimar Germany and Britain and Europe during the interwar years.
Interwar Japan Beyond the West by
In the late nineteenth century, Japan was the only non-Western country to have successfully faced the challenges of Westernization. At the end of the Meiji Era, just three decades after the end of the country's feudal age, it became Great Britain's ally, while its soldiers were deployed in Beijing, operating alongside the great European powers. Meanwhile, in Japan, the perception of a scientifically and technologically advanced West came to be imbued by negative connotations, generated by the threatening Western presence in Asia. In order to avoid succumbing to the European imperialist yoke, Japan has itself gradually converted its international status by embracing an imperialistic identity. The new image of the world responding to the current historical situation could only result from a philosophy immersed in historicity, far from its metaphysical dimension. In a philosophy mediated by history, self-awareness would have coincided with the historical manifestations of history. Based on these premises, the Chuokoron group seemed to have presented Japan's hegemonic aspirations as an expression of its real historical manifestation. This sounded like an explicit declaration of ideologically supporting the country's involvement in the war. But what is the meaning that the participants in the debates attributed to the idea of Japan's real historical manifestation? The answer lies in a moral obligation that the country saw as the duty of world history: overcoming modern civilization while promoting a new culture.
The legacy of Langres : the U.S. Army's plan to educate National Guard and Reserve officers in the interwar period / by