The Atomic Bazaar
by
William Langewiesche investigates the burgeoning global threat of nuclear weapons production, presenting the story of the inexorable drift of nuclear weapons technology from the hands of the rich into the hands of the poor.
Nuclear Terror
by
These are frightening times for us all: Sarin nerve gas being sprayed on innocent civilians in Syria, threats that biological warfare agents might be spread about on the New York Subway and the most terrifying of all, three dirty bomb attacks thwarted in Russia. The reality of all these developments is that the environment in which we live today is being seriously threatened by the calculated use of weapons of mass destruction, and from a variety of dissident sources. Many rogue nations have attempted to build the bomb, an enormously complex task. So far only Pakistan and North Korea have succeeded, with Iran right now on the cusp of making that breakthrough. South Africa built six atom bombs in the 1970/1980s but with British, American and help from the International Atomic Energy Agency dismantled both the weapons and the entire program shortly before Nelson Mandela came to power. In Nuclear Terror, Venter assesses the developments over the past 10 years of different countries in their attempts to build a nuclear program. Not inflammatory, or scaremongering, Venter takes an objective stance in chronicling these recent developments overseas and adds another valuable contribution to this conversation.
Stopping the Bomb
by
Stopping the Bomb examines the historical development and effectiveness of American efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Nicholas L. Miller offers here a novel theory that argues changes in American nonproliferation policy are the keys to understanding the nuclear landscape from the 1960s onward. The Chinese and Indian nuclear tests in the 1960s and 1970s forced the US government, Miller contends, to pay new and considerable attention to the idea of nonproliferation and to reexamine its foreign policies. Stopping the Bomb explores the role of the United States in combating the spread of nuclear weapons, an area often ignored to date. He explains why these changes occurred and how effective US policies have been in preventing countries from seeking and acquiring nuclear weapons. Miller's findings highlight the relatively rapid move from a permissive approach toward allies acquiring nuclear weapons to a more universal nonproliferation policy no matter whether friend or foe. Four in-depth case studies of US nonproliferation policy--toward Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran, and France--elucidate how the United States can compel countries to reverse ongoing nuclear weapons programs. Miller's findings in Stopping the Bomb have important implications for the continued study of nuclear proliferation, US nonproliferation policy, and beyond.
Anticipating a Nuclear Iran
by
This volume is based on the assumption that Iran will soon obtain nuclear weapons, and Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. develop alternative models for assessing the challenges of a nuclear Iran for U.S. security. Through three scenario models, the book explores the political, strategic, and operational challenges facing the United States in a post-Cold War world. The authors concentrate on the type of nuclear capability Iran might develop; the conditions under which Iran might resort to threatened or actual weapons use; the extent to which Iran's military strategy and declaratory policy might embolden Iran and its proxies to pursue more aggressive policies in the region and vis-à-vis the United States; and Iran's ability to transfer nuclear materials to others within and outside the region, possibly sparking a nuclear cascade. Drawing on recent post-Cold War deterrence theory, the authors consider Iran's nuclear ambitions as they relate to its foreign policy objectives, domestic politics, and role in the Islamic world, and they suggest specific approaches to improve U.S. defense and deterrence planning.
Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran
by
Some time in the coming decade, Iran will probably acquire nuclear weapons or the capacity to quickly produce them. This monograph provides a midterm strategy for dealing with Iran that neither begins nor ends at the point at which Tehran acquires a nuclear weapon capability. It proposes an approach that neither acquiesces to a nuclear-armed Iran nor refuses to admit the possibility--indeed, the likelihood--of this occurring.
In the Aftermath of the JCPOA: Restoring Balance in the US-Iran Deterrent Relationship https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17021.5
The United States Withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal with Iran: Lessons from a Simulation https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17033
President Trump’s Announcement on the Nuclear Agreement https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17037
The Middle East’s Nuclear Technology Clock Is Ticking https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep16904
Smart power: the United States, Iran, and a nuclear deal. http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll3/id/3317
Elements of its own demise: Key flaws in the Obama Administration's domestic approach to the Iran Nuclear Deal. http://lumen.cgsccarl.com/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=136372331&site=ehost-live&scope=site
Image Source: United States Institute of Peace/The Iran Primer
https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2015/mar/16/iran-nuke-program-2-abcs-sites